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Abstract. We introduce a non-partisan probability distribution on congres-
sional redistricting of North Carolina which emphasizes the equal partition
of the population and the compactness of districts. When random districts
are drawn and the results of the 2012 election were re-tabulated under the
drawn districtings, we find that an average of 7.6 democratic representatives
are elected. 95% of the randomly sampled redistrictings produced between
6 and 9 Democrats. Both of these facts are in stark contrast with the 4
Democrats elected in the 2012 elections with the same vote counts. This
brings into serious question the idea that such elections represent the “will of
the people.” It underlines the ability of redistricting to undermine the demo-
cratic process, while on the face allowing democracy to proceed.
1. Introduction
Democracy is typically equated with expressing the will of the people through
government. Perceived failures of democracy in representative governments are
typically attributed to the voice of the people being muted and obstructed by the
actions of special interests or the sheer size of government. The implication being
that the voice and will of the people exists as a clear well defined voice which only
needs to be better heard.
Yet the will of the people is not monolithic. It is not always so simple to obtain
a consensus or even a clear majority opinion. We rely on our elections as a proxy to
express our collective opinions and our political will. Of course, Arrow’s Impossibil-
ity Theorem guarantees that all electoral systems have paradoxes. However, there
is a more profound problem with this notion; the very concept of a clear majority
voice is problematic. In the United States, the federalist system, on the national
level, and district representation schemes, on the municipal level, acknowledge that
the people’s voice is geographically diverse and that we value the expression of that
diversity in our government. It is reasonable to ask how singular is the received
“will of the people” when it is filtered through geographically based districts. We
take election results to give the elected officials a mandate to act in the people’s
name. How sensitive are the election results to the choice of districts? By exten-
sion, how sensitive to the choice of redistricting is the received impression of the
“will of the people?” Our results show that the “will of the people” is not a single
election outcome but rather a distribution of possible outcomes. The exact same
vote counts can lead to drastically different outcomes depending on the choice of
districts.
With the increased insertion of politics into the congressional redistricting pro-
cess, exploring these questions in the context of house congressional districts seems
particularly important and timely. The 2010 redistricting of North Carolina is a
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useful example and testing ground for this general line of inquiry. Most would
agree that politics had a hand in the North Carolina redistricting process. The mo-
tivations were diverse. The twelfth district was drawn to create a majority black
district. Others seemingly were drawn to split and pack different voting blocks
to diminish their political power, particularly those of the democratic party. The
question remains of how large was the effect of the redistricting on the outcome.
In the 2012 congressional elections, which were based on the 2010 districts, four
out of the thirteen congressional seats were filled by Democrats. Yet in seem-
ing contradiction, the majority of votes were cast for Democratic candidates on
the state wide level. The election results hinged on the geographic positioning of
congressional districts. While this outcome is clearly the result of politically drawn
districts, perhaps it is not the result of excessive tampering. Our country has a long
history of balancing the rights of urban areas with high population with those of
more rural, less populated areas. Our federalist and electoral structures enshrined
the idea that the one-person-one-vote ideal could be modified to support other ob-
jectives, particularly that of regionalism. It might be that in North Carolina the
subversion of the results of the global vote count would happen in any redistricting
which balances the representation of the urban with the rural or the beach, with the
mountains, and each with the Piedmont. Maybe the vast majority of reasonable
districts which one might draw would have these issues due to the geography of the
population’s distribution. We are left asking the basic question: “How much does
the outcome depend on the choice of districts?” This can be further refined by
asking “what are the outcomes for a typical choice of districts?” or “When should
a redistricting be considered outside the norm?” These last two refinements require
some way of quantifying what the typical outcomes are for a given set of votes. This
turns the usual election procedure on its head. We are interested in fixing the votes
and then changing the redistricting and observing how the results change. Since
we will explore these questions in the context of the American political system, we
will assume that people vote for parties, not people, which is of course not true.
However, in these polarized times it is not the worst approximation. We still find
the results extremely illuminating.
Once one accepts that the expressed “people’s will” is not a single outcome but
a distribution of outcomes depending on the redistricting, it expands the realm
of possibility in evaluating redistrictings. The principle goal of this article is to
construct an appropriate probability distribution on all redistrictings and explore
its implications. Our probability distribution will be nonpartisan in that it will
only make use of the distribution of the population and not any information about
party affiliation, historical voting patterns, race or socioeconomic class.
We do not intend for this work to be the definitive answer in this direction.
Rather, we have erred on the side of simplicity by constructing a probability distri-
bution which only considers the compactness of districts and the degree to which
the population is partitioned equally. More complicated procedures might value
minority representation or traditional political boundaries more. We simply wish
to show the utility of a simple probability distribution placed on the space of redis-
trictings to illuminate the degree to which the outcome of an election depends on
the choice of districts and if a given redistricting produces representative results.
Using such a distribution, one begins to obtain a feel for the degree to which the
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perceived will of the people fluctuates and how typical, and perhaps “fair”, a given
redistricting is.
In Section 2 we describe our main results. In Section 3, we detail the construction
of a probability measure on possible redestrictings. In Section 4, we explain a
number of illustrative examples designed for those not familiar with the types of
Gibbs probability measures constructed in Section 3. In Section 6, we discuss the
algorithm used to draw example redistrictings from our probability measure. In
Section 7, we discuss how the model is calibrated to produce acceptable results.
In Section 8, we make a small digression to discuss the racial make up of districts
produced by our measure. Finally, in Section 10, we make some concluding remarks
and discuss some future directions.
2. Summary of Results
To examine the effect of the choices of districts on North Carolina Congres-
sional elections, we will place a probability distribution on the space of all possible
redistricting plans of the state into thirteen federal Congressional districts. We
will then choose a redistricting according to this probability and then rerun the
North Carolina congressional elections from 2012 using the actual votes recorded in
each voting tabulation district (VTD). This will produce a winner from each of the
thirteen congressional districts. We will record the number of democrats (or equiv-
alently republicans) elected and then repeat the procedure drawing a new, fresh
redistricting from our probability distribution and again recording the outcome of
the election with these new districts. After many such draws, we obtain a histogram
showing the distribution of outcomes. It shows the sensitivity of the results to the
districts chosen. The results of this procedure for our principle model are given
by the histogram given in Figure 2 which shows fraction of different numbers of
Democratic representatives obtained by sampling about 100 random redistrictings
from our random distribution. This distribution gives a quantitative measure of the
“will of the people” in a given election. Those in search of a single number might
well take the mean (7.6 Democratic representatives) or the median (7 Democratic
representatives). However, the entirety of the distribution gives more information.
Over 50% of the samples produce either 7 or 8 Democratic representative. All of
the samples produce between 6 and 9 Democratic representatives. These results
should be compared with the current North Carolina house delegation which has
only 4 Democratic representatives.
In light of these results, it might be reasonable to accept redistrictings which
produce outcomes within one standard deviation of the mean to be truly represen-
tative while those outside to be suspect and not representative of the will of the
people. Not once in our run were 4 or less Democratic seats produced. While it is
possible, our results show that it is extremely unlikely that a random redistricting,
chosen according to our nonpartisan probability distribution, would produce 5 or
less Democratic seats if the actual vote counts from the 2012 election are used.
In building our probability measure on redistrictings, we will only include the
three main legal requirements of a redistricting plan. First, the districts should be
connected. Second, they should come as close as possible to having equal number
of people. Lastly, they should be as compact as possible. Our procedure will tac-
itly include the fact that redistricting should have some relationship to historical
districts and communities; however, we postpone that discussion to later. (See
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Figure 1. Histogram of Democratic seats counts after over 300
samples. (λ = 0.3 and Long period. See Section 7)
the end of Section 6.) We emphasis that no information about party affiliation or
the vote counts from any election were used in generating the probability distribu-
tion. Furthermore, the results in Figure 2 used the actual vote tally from the 2012
congressional election.
Given the suppressing nature of the results, it is natural to ask if the districts pro-
duced are reasonable. Figures 10–10 give example redistrictings chosen randomly
from the collection we produced. The law mandates that each district should have
as close to 113 of the total population as possible. All of the districts considered in
making Figure 2 had a relative deviation of less than 0.7% from the ideal of 113 . 50%
percent had a relative deviation less than 0.09%. This compares favorably with the
districting currently under use which has relative deviations less than 0.7%.
Our goal is neither to provide a method for producing usable redistricting nor
a definitive model for the likelihood of a given redistricting, but rather to provide
a simple model which can be understood and which can shed light on the “the
people’s will.” Nonetheless, our model did contain a tunable parameter, denoted
λ, which varies between zero and one and measures the relative weight given to
the constraints of equal division of population versus the compactness of districts.
When λ is close to zero, all of the weight is given to the compactness, while when
λ is close to one, all of the weight is given to the division of population. Since
the two effects are not necessarily on the same scale, λ equal one-half does not
necessarily represent the equal balancing of the effects. One must look at the sample
redistrictings to calibrate the parameters. The data quoted above and shown in
Figure 2 used λ = 0.3 which was chosen because the districts produced with this
value were overwhelmingly better than the currently used districts at splitting the
population evenly between the thirteen districts and at being more compact.
We further discuss selecting a value of λ in Section 7. Nonetheless, in Figure 2
we summarize the results with four different values of λ as well as two different
versions of the method used to sample the probability distribution: “Long Period”
and “Short Period” methods. The “Long Period” method is preferred and was
used in Figure 2 and the data quoted above. The “Short Period” method allows for
more data to be collected but is less effective at drawing from the desired probability
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distribution. A discussion of the issues involved is given in Section 6 and Section 7.
.1 .2 .3 .4 .1 .2 .3 .4
4
5
6
7
8
9
Short Period Long Period
λ
N
u
m
b
er
of
D
em
o
cr
a
ts
Figure 2. Plotted are the summary of the elections for four dif-
ferent values of the parameter λ used in defining our probability
distribution of redistrictings. Each of the four different values of
λ is under a shorter and longer heating/cooling cycles. The solid
green dot is the median. The dark blue box is centered on the me-
dian to contain 50% of the points. The lighter blue box is centered
to contain 90% of the data. The hollow squares give the max and
min values.
What is striking about Figure 2 is that the basic conclusions are relatively in-
sensitive to the choice of λ or the details of how we sample the system. All of the
distributions we produced have a mean around seven. All of the distributions are
fairly concentrated around the mean with 50% of the values concentrated on only
two values, one always being seven. It is also worth noting that all but one of the
distributions never produced only four democratic representatives which was the
number of democratic representatives elected in the 2012 elections. The one that
did, did so in less than 5% of the samples and was the distribution possessing fewest
desirable properties of all those considered. Hence a randomly chosen redistricting
from any of the probability distribution considered is all but guaranteed to produce
drastically different results from the 2012 elections while using the exact same votes
as the 2012 election.
It is clear that the current situation of only four democratic representatives is
not representative of the will of the people. The results of the election seem to
have very little to do with the will of the people. It is worth recalling that our
probability distribution on all possible redistrictings was agnostic relative to the
different political parties. It uses no information about the number of registered
democrats or republicans in a district nor its racial or socioeconomic make up.
We are simply drawing, in an unbiased way, redistrictings, favoring those which
are compact and those which have approximately 1/13th of the state’s population.
The result left the authors wondering, “Is this democracy?”
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3. A probability distribution on reasonable redistricting
We will represent the state of North Carolina as a graph G with edges E and
vertices V . Each vertex represents a Voting Tabulation District (VTD) and an edge
between two vertices exists if the two VTDs are adjacent on the map. This graph
representing the North Carolina voting landscape has over 2500 vertices and over
8000 edges.1
A redistricting plan is a function from the set of vertices to the integers from
one to thirteen (since North Carolina has thirteen seats in the house of representa-
tives). More formally, recalling that V was the set of vertices, we will represent a
redistricting plan by a function ξ : V → {1, 2, . . . , 13}. We let R denote the space
of all redistricting plans. If ξ(v) = i for some v ∈ V then the VTD represented by
vertex v is in district i. Similarly for i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 13} and a plan ξ, the i district
which we will denote by Di(ξ) is given by {v ∈ V : ξ(v) = i}. We wish to consider
redistricting plans ξ such that each district Di(ξ) is a single connected component.
We will denote the collection of such redistricting plans by Rconnected ⊂ R.
As already described in Section 2, our goal is to produce a probability distribution
on the space of redistrictings. To define our probability measure on the space of
redistrictings, we will first assign a score to each redistricting plan ξ according to
how well it satisfies our ideals, with lower scores preferred. To describe the score
function on the space of redistricting plans, we need to attach to our graph G =
(V,E) some data which gives relevant features of each VTD. We define the positive
functions pop(v) and area(v) for a vertex v ∈ V as respectively the population
and geographic area of the VTD associated with the vertex v. We extend these
functions to a collection of vertices A ⊂ V by
pop(A) =
∑
v∈A
pop(v) and area(A) =
∑
v∈A
area(v) .(1)
We will think of the boundary of a district Di(ξ) to be the subset of the edges
E which connect vertices inside of Di(ξ) to vertices outside of Di(ξ). We will write
D. i(ξ) for the boundary of the district Di(ξ). Since we want to include the exterior
boundary of each district (the section bordering an adjacent state or the ocean), we
add to V the vertex o which represents the “outside” and connect it with an edge
to each vertex representing a VTD which is on the boundary of the state. We will
always assume that any redistricting ξ always satisfies ξ(v) = 0 if and only v = o.
Since ξ always satisfies ξ(o) = 0 and hence o 6∈ Di(ξ) for i ≥ 1, it does not matter
that we have not defined area(o) or pop(o) as o is never included in the districts.
Given an edge e ∈ E which connects the two vertices v, v˜ ∈ V , we define
boundary(e) to be the length of common border of the VTDs associated with the
vertex v and v˜. As before, we extend the definition to the boundary of a set of
edges B ⊂ E by
boundary(B) =
∑
e∈B
boundary(e) .(2)
With these preliminaries out of the way, we return to defining the score functions
used to assess the goodness of a redistricting. We will construct our total score
function as a convex combination of two terms: a population score Jpop and a
1See Section 9 for some technical notes about the construction of this graph.
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compactness score Jcompact. We define the population score by
Jpop(ξ) = cpop
13∑
i=1
(
pop(Di(ξ))− Npop
13
)2
where Npop is the total population of North Carolina, pop(Di(ξ)) is the population
of the district Di(ξ) as defined in (1), and cpop is a positive constant which is used
to make the size of the two score terms comparable.
We define the compactness score Jcompact as a ratio of the sum of the perimeter
to the total area of each district. This ratio, often referred to as the “isoperimetric
constant” of a region, is minimized for a circle which is the most compact shape.
Hence we define
Jcompact(ξ) = ccompact
13∑
i=1
[
boundary(D. i(ξ))
]2
area(Di(ξ))
.
where D. i(ξ) is the set of edges which define the boundary, boundary(D. i(ξ)) is
the length of the boundary of district Di and area(Di(ξ)) is its area. As before
ccompact is used to make the size of Jcompact and Jpop comparable. After some
experimentation, we found that cpop = 1/5000 and ccompact = 2000 bring Jcompact
and Jpop to about the same scale. This compactness measure is one of two measures
often used in the legal literature where it is referred to as the parameter score[4, 5].
A second measure often used is the ratio of the area of the district to that of the
smallest circle which contains the district. This second measure, usually referred
to as the dispersion score, is more sensitive to overly elongated districts though the
parameter score also penalizes them. We will not use the dispersion score since the
spatial location of each VTD was not readily available.
Recall that Rconnected was the collection of redistricting policies in which all
districts are connected. For any λ ∈ [0, 1] and ξ ∈ Rconnected, we define Jλ by
Jλ(ξ) = λJpop(ξ) + (1− λ)Jcompact(ξ) .(3)
The parameter λ dictates the balance between the two energies. The lower Jλ(ξ) is,
the more evenly distributed the population is and the more compact the districts
Di(ξ) are.
So far we have defined Jλ(ξ) for ξ ∈ Rconnected. We now extended the definition
by
(4) Jλ =
{
λJpop(ξ) + (1− λ)Jcompact(ξ) ξ ∈ Rconnected
∞ ξ 6∈ Rconnected
We will see that if Jλ(ξ) = ∞, then the probability that the redistricting ξ is
considered will be zero.
Next for all β > 0 and λ ∈ [0, 1], we define the probability measure Pλ,β on the
space of redistrictings R by
Pλ,β(ξ) = e
−βJλ(ξ)
Zλ,β(5)
where Zλ,β is simply the normalization constant defined so that Pλ,β(R) = 1. In
other words,
Zλ,β =
∑
ξ∈R
e−βJλ(ξ) .
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Notice that as promised if ξ 6∈ Rconnected then e−βJλ(ξ) = e−∞ = 0 and we see that
Pλ,β(Rconnected) = 1. Hence, all of the probability is concentrated on redistrictings
which have simply connected districts. The positive constant β is often called
the “inverse temperature” in analogy with statistical mechanics and gas dynamics.
When β is very small (the high temperature regime), different elements ofRconnected
have close to equal probability. As β increases (the “temperature decreases”), the
measure concentrates the probability on the redistrictings ξ ∈ R which minimize
Jλ(ξ). After some experimentation we found that β = 0.01 produced districts with
reasonably well balanced populations and compact footprints when compared to
the districts currently used.
3.1. Estimating Boundary Sizes. Unfortunately, not all of the data we need
to define Jλ is readily available. The information to define pop(v) and area(v) is
publicly available for all of the VTDs in North Carolina [2] [1], while the value for
boundary(e) is not. In principle it could be obtained from the map showing the
North Carolina VTDs. However, we had no means to efficiently automate this task.
Since each of the VTDs is relatively small and many make up a given congressional
district, we opted to employ a simple approximation.
Since the area of a VTD and the number of neighboring VTDs are readily avail-
able, we approximated the length of the shared boundary between two VTDs as
follows. By assuming each VTD is a circle, we expressed the circumference as a
function of the area by
Circumference = 2pi
3
2
√
Area .
Then if we further make the approximation that the circumference is equally shared
with each neighboring VTD, we can estimate the shared boundary between two
adjacent VTDs as
Shared Boundary = 2pi
3
2
√
Area
Number of Neighbors
Since this approximation could be centered on either of the two vertices which make
up the edge, we average the two answers. Denoting the degree of a vertex by deg(v)
and noting that constants will not change the relative size of the term we define
boundary(e) =
1
2
(√
area(v)
deg(v)
+
√
area(v′)
deg(v′)
)
(6)
if e is an edge connecting vertices v and v′ with neither edge being the “outside”
vertex o. If the edge e connects an interior vertex v with the outside vertex o, we
set
boundary(e) =
√
area(v)
deg(v)
(7)
since the estimate centered at o does not make sense.
4. Motivating and Explanatory Examples
To clarify concepts used to define a probability measure on the space of redis-
trictings, we now give some elementary, illustrative examples. Those familiar with
the idea of a Gibbs measure can skip ahead to the next section.
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To better understand the role of the inverse temperature β, we begin by con-
structing a series of measures on the integers {1, 2, . . . , 20}. As in the redistrictings
setting, we begin by defining a score function which we denote by H. For any
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 20} we define
H(i) = (i− 5)2 · (i− 15)2 + 1(8)
and the probability measure Pβ by
Pβ(x) = e
−βH(x)
Zβ
where Zβ =
20∑
i=1
e−βH(i) .
Figure 3 shows a plot of Pβ for β equal to .001, .005, and .01. Since H(x) is smallest
when x is 5 or 15, the measure tends to concentrate around these values. However,
the degree it does so is governed by the inverse temperature β. When β is very
small, the probability is more evenly distributed. When β is larger, the probability
is highly concentrated around the minimum of H.
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Figure 3. Plot of the probability of the point {1, 2, . . . , 20} for
Pβ with β equal to 0.001, 0.005, and 0.01.
Now lets consider a second example to explore the roll of the relative weighting
parameter λ in (3). Again we will construct an artificial example in lower dimensions
where the effects are easier to visualize. We will place a probability measure Pλ,β
on {1, · · · , 20}2, the space of all pairs (i, k) where i, k ∈ {1, . . . , 20}. As before we
will define
Pλ,β(i, k) = e
−βHλ(i,k)
Zβ,λ
where the score function Hλ is defined for λ ∈ [0, 1] by
Hλ(i, k) = λHsingle(i, k) + (1− λ)Hpair(9)
with Hsingle(i, k) = H(i) +H(k) where H was defined in (8), Hpair is defined by
Hpair(i, j) = (i− k)2, and as before the normalizing constant is given by
Zβ,λ =
20∑
i,k=1
e−βHλ(i,k) .
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Figure 4 shows the probability in a two-dimensional “heat map” for different values
of λ and β = .001. Red points denote relatively high probability, white points
denote probability in the middle of the range, and blue points denote relatively
low probabilities. The value of λ starts high in the upper right plot and decreases
clockwise to a lowest value in the upper left corner.
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Figure 4. Heat maps of Pλ,β(i, k) with red denoting relatively
high probability and blue relatively low. All plots use β = 0.001.
The values of λ are 0.95 (upper right), 0.75 (lower right), 0.25
(lower left), and 0.05 (upper left)
Notice how as λ shifts, the qualitative features of the measure shift. When λ is
small, the value of the score is dominated by Hpair(i, k) which favors pairs where i
and k are close. When λ is large, Hsingle(i, k) dominates and the most probability
is placed on pairs near the points {(5, 5), (5, 15), (15, 5)(15, 15)}. For intermediate
values of λ, a balance is struck between the two goals.
5. Rerunning elections with the 2012 votes
To any redistricting ξ ∈ R we will associate an election outcome using the actual
2012 votes in each VTD. We let votesD(v) and votesR(v) denote respectively the
number of democratic and republican votes in the VTD associated with the vertex
v in the 2012 congressional elections as obtained from the North Carolina Board of
Elections [3]. Then as before, for a set of vertices A ⊂ V we define
votesD(A) =
∑
v∈A
votesD(v) and votesR(A) =
∑
v∈A
votesR(v) .
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Then for any redistricting ξ we define
dem(ξ) = #{i : votesD(Di(ξ)) > votesR(Di(ξ))}
repub(ξ) = #{i : votesD(Di(ξ)) < votesR(Di(ξ))}
where #C is the number of elements in the set C. Hence dem(ξ) and repub(ξ)
give the number of democratic and republican congressional seats associated to a
redistricting ξ if we assume that each voter votes for the party they did in the 2012
election.
We are then primarily interested in the distribution of dem(Ξ) (or equivalently
repub(Ξ)) when Ξ is chosen randomly according to the probability distribution Pλ,β .
This will give some understanding of the make up of the congressional delegation
for typical redistricting. It is also useful to record mean of dem(Ξ) which is defined
by
µdem =
∑
ξ∈R
dem(ξ)Pλ,β(ξ) .
6. Sampling the probability measure Pλ,β
There are more then 132500 ≈ 7.2× 102784 different redistrictings in R. Current
estimates on the number of atoms in the universe range from 1078 to 1082 and the
number of seconds since the big bang at the creation of the universe is estimated to
be 4.3× 1017 seconds. While there are significantly less redistricting in Rconnected
(the set of simply connected redistrictings), it is certainly not practical to enumerate
the redistrictings to find those with the lowest values of Jλ and hence the largest
probability.
The standard and very effective way to escape this curse of dimensionality is to
use a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) algorithm to sample from the probability
distribution Pλ,β . The basic idea is to define a random walk onRconnected which has
Pλ,β as its globally attracting stationary measure. We do this using the standard
Metropolis-Hastings algorithm which we now briefly explain.
The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is designed to use one Markov transition
kernel Q (the proposal chain) to sample from another Markov transition kernel
which has a unique stationary distribution µ (the target distribution). Q(ξ, ξ′)
gives the probability of moving from the redistricting ξ to the redistricting ξ′ in the
proposal Markov chain and is assumed to be readily computable. We wish to use
Q to draw a sample distributed according to µ. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
(1) Choose some initial state ξ ∈ R.
(2) Propose a new state ξ′ with transition probabilities given by Q(ξ, ξ′).
(3) Accept the proposed state with probability p = min
(
1, µ(ξ
′)q(ξ′,ξ)
µ(ξ)Q(ξ,ξ′)
)
.
(4) Repeat steps 2 and 3.
After an initial burn-in period, the stationary distribution of this Markov chain
matches the stationary measure µ. Thus, the states can be treated as samples from
the desired distribution.
The stationary measure we would like to sample is Pλ,β . Our initial state is the
districting that was used for the 2012 US House of Representatives election. We
define the proposal chain used for proposing new redistricting in the following way:
(1) Uniformly pick a conflicted edge at random. An edge, e = (u, v) is a
conflicted edge if ξ(u) 6= ξ(v), ξ(u) 6= 0, ξ(v) 6= 0.
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(2) For chosen edge e = (u, v), with probability 12 , either:
ξ′(w) =
{
ξ(w) w 6= u
ξ(v) u
or ξ′(w) =
{
ξ(w) w 6= v
ξ(u) v
Let con(ξ) be the number of conflicted edges for districting ξ. Then we have
q(ξ, ξ′) = 12con(ξ) . The acceptance probability is given by:
p = min
(
1,
con(ξ)
con(ξ′)
e−β(Jλ(ξ
′)−Jλ(ξ)))
Recall that if a districting ξ′ is not connected, then Jλ(ξ′) = ∞. Thus, proposed
redistrictings that are not connected are never accepted.
After a burn in period, every m-th districting can be taken as a sample from
Pλ,β for some m. If m is long enough, the samples will be essentially independent.
In our test, we used m = 40, 000 and m = 100, 000. The principle results quoted in
Section 2 used the larger value. The fact that the results for the two values were
similar leads credence to conclusion that m was taken sufficiently large.
The time the system takes to equilibrate and explore the state space depends
on the inverse temperature parameter β. The smaller the β, the longer it takes.
When β is large, it is harder to accept steps, so the Markov chain will get trapped
in a valley where the energy Jλ has a local minimum. Alternatively, when β is
small, the Markov chain easily explores the sample space without settling into a
valley. Since we wish to heavily favor the valleys, we will use a β = 0.01 which we
found to be a “low temperature” value for the system with most of the probability
concentrated at relatively good minimizers.
To make sure that the Markov chain explores the sample space while still pro-
ducing sample districtings of low score, we use a heating and cooling process. The
Markov chain alternates between using a lower value of β = 0.001 (higher temper-
ature) and the higher value of β = 0.01 (lower temperature). If samples are going
to be drawn every m-th step, then the value of β will switch every m2 steps, namely
n = 20, 000 when m = 40, 000 or n = 50, 000 when m = 100, 000. The sample is
taken at the end of each cooling period.
Since the space of redistrictings is enormous, we are only in reality sampling from
a hopefully large region around our initial condition. In this way all of our samples
are related to the current configuration. The samples produced will be closer on
average to the current districting than would be redistrictings chosen randomly
according to Pλ,β . In this way we are tacitly honoring the requirement that the
redistricting have a relation to historical districts if possible.
7. Calibrating the parameter λ
To calibrate the parameter λ, we tested λ = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, and 0.4. We tune λ so
that the values of Jpop and Jcompact obtained with Pλ,β are comparable to those
obtained with the current districts. We also compared the two different frequencies
of cycling between β = 0.01 and β = 0.001: the “short period” of n = 20, 000
and the “long period” of n = 50, 000. The results are given in Figure 6. Since the
results are comparable for the two choices of n, we conclude that n = 50, 000 is
sufficiently large to obtain good samples. We would like to choose λ so that Jpop
and Jcompact are almost always below the current values. This is true for λ = .3 or
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Figure 5. Population and Compactness scores vs 4 values of λ
each under the shorter and longer heating/cooling cycles. Solid
green dot is the median. Dark blue box is centered on the median to
contain 50% of the points. Lighter blue box is centered to contain
90% of the data. Hollow squares give the max and min values.
Solid black horizontal lines give the value of each score for the
current redistricting.
λ = .4. Since our current districting is not very compact but does a good job of
evenly dividing the population, we have selected λ = .3 as our preferred value.
8. Racial Make Up
In 2010, about 21% of the state’s population was African American. In the 2010
and previous redistrictings, an effort was made to produce a district which could
elect African American representatives. Two of the current districts have 50% or
more African Americans. Since African Americans tend to vote Democratic, includ-
ing any term in the score function to produce such a district could be perceived as
partisan gerrymandering which we want to avoid in our study.
Nonetheless it is interesting to note the racial makeup of the districts created by
our model and compare them to the current figures. Figure 7 gives the results for
the African American and Hispanic populations. Our samples never produced a ma-
jority African American district. The two districts with largest African American
representation had on average around 36% and 32% African American population
which compares favorably to the state wide percentage of 22%, but not to the cur-
rent districts. The Hispanic population also saw a drop in their percentage in their
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Figure 6. Sorted fraction of African Americans and Hispanics in
each of the districts from the random samples (λ = .3 and long
period). The red marks on the left show current redistricting’s
level.
most populous district from 14% in the current districts to on average 11% in the
redistricting produced by our model.
It is of course possible to add additional score functions to prefer the creation of
minority districts. The current results should be seen as the results if there is no
intervention on the policy side to produce a particular minority district.
9. Technical Notes
There are a few technical notes that we would like to address in this section.
In section 3, we define a districting as a function ξ : V → {1, 2, . . . , 13}. To refer
to the current congressional districts, we need each vertex of our graph to belong
to only one congressional district. We initially defined each vertex as a VTD.
However, there are 65 VTDs which lie within two congressional districts. We split
each of these VTDs to create two vertices, one for each of the two congressional
districts. As before, vertices are connected when they are adjacent on the map. The
congressional district boundaries are used to determine the boundary between the
split VTDs, allowing us to determine which vertices are adjacent. Since population
data is only available at the VTD level, we approximate the population for a split
VTD as half of the population of the original VTD. Similarly, we approximate the
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area of a split VTD as half of the area of the original VTD. For brevity, we refer
to each vertex as a VTD, even though some of the vertices are a split VTD.
Another technical note is that there are some votes that cannot be attributed to
a specific VTD. For example, absentee voting allows votes to be cast outside of an
individuals home VTD. The number of such votes is negligible to those votes that
can be attributed to a VTD and we simply neglect them.
A small error in the MCMC code lead to mildly nonsymmetric transition prob-
abilities in some of the earlier data collected (in contrast to what was explained
in Section 6). Some of that data is included in the analysis in this preliminary
draft. New runs which will replace all of this data are under way but only partially
complete. Comparison with new data generated shows no qualitative change from
what is shown here. All of the nonsymmetric data will be replaced in the final
version.
10. Conclusions
We have provided a prototype probability measure on the space of congressional
redistrictings of North Carolina. The measure was non-partisan in that it considers
no information beyond the total population and shape of the districts. The proba-
bility model was then calibrated to produce redistrictings which are comparable to
the current district to the extent they partition the population equally and produce
compact districts. Then effectively independent draws were made from this prob-
ability distribution using the Metropolis-Hastings variant of Markov chain Monte
Carlo. For each redistricting drawn, the 2012 U.S. House of representatives election
was retabulated using the actual vote counts to determine the party affiliation of
the winner in each district. The statistics of the number of democratic winners give
a portrait of the range of outcomes possible for the given set of votes cast. This
distribution could be viewed as the true will of the people.
Redistrictings producing outcomes which are significantly different than the typ-
ical results obtained from random sampled redistrictings are arguable at odds with
the will of the people expressed in the record of their votes. The fact that the
election outcomes are so dependent on the choice of redistrictings demonstrates the
need for checks and balances to ensure that democracy is served when redistrictings
are drawn and the election outcome is representative of the votes casted.
It seems unreasonable to expect that politics would not enter into the process
of redistricting. Since the legislators represent the people and presumably express
their will, restricting their ability to express that will seems contrary to the very
idea of democracy. This seems to be the opinion of a number of the current Supreme
Court Justices. Yet the work in this note could likely be developed into a criteria
to decide when a redistricting fails to be sufficiently democratic. It would perhaps
be reasonable to only allow redistrictings which yield the more typical results,
eschewing the most atypical as a subversion of the peoples will. This would still
leave plenty of room for politics but add a counter-weight to balance that role of
partisanship when it acts against the democratic ideals of a republic govened by
the people.
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Figure 7. Current districting of NC in 2014
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Figure 8. A sample redistricting from Pλ,β with λ = .3 and the
long heating/cooling cycle.
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Figure 9. A sample redistricting from Pλ,β with λ = .3 and the
long heating/cooling cycle.
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Figure 10. A sample redistricting from Pλ,β with λ = .3 and the
long heating/cooling cycle.
